



DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS  













McMASTER UNIVERSITY  
Department of Economics  
1280 Main Street West  
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada  
L8S 4M4  
http://socserv.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/Can Auctions Control Market Power in Emissions Trading Markets?











Using eight sessions (twenty-four ten-period markets) in a double ABA cross-over design, we
demonstrate clear evidence of market power in double-auction emission trading markets (agents
who are not constrained to only buy or sell).  Conventional theory predicts that in half of the
market-power environments monopsony should emerge and in half monopoly should emerge. 
Market-power outcomes are frequently observed,  most often in the form of price discrimination,
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Introduction
Emissions trading is frequently advocated as an instrument for market-based
environmental regulation.  Unfortunately many potential emissions trading markets are likely to be
sufficiently concentrated to create market power.  In particular, it is frequently thought that the
United States will effectively be a monopsonist in any international emissions trading under the
Kyoto protocol.  If market power is exercised, emissions trading may fail to achieve an efficient
allocation of responsibilities for abatement.  Moreover, the gains from trade may be reallocated
inequitably.
The exercise of market power may be constrained by the trading institution within which
contracts are formed.  In particular, it has been suggested that the double auction market is
particularly resistant to market power.  This suggestion is based on laboratory evidence.  Smith
(1981) found that monopolists trading in a double auction market experienced difficulty in
maintaining monopoly prices.  Monopolists in his double oral auctions were able to obtain only
about 25 percent of the potential monopoly price increase (for the last period),  in contrast to their
ability to achieve 100 percent of the potential increase under a posted bid institution.
2   Smith and
Williams (1989) replicated this experiment and found much lower prices; on average their
monopolists achieved only about 6 percent of the potential price increase in the last period.  Smith
and Smith and Williams explain this result by postulating that buyers’ resistance to high prices is2
increased once the monopolist reveals himself prepared to sell at lower prices.  
Further experiments have confirmed that firms can exercise market power more easily in a
posted-price environment than in a double auction environment.  After summarizing laboratory
work in this area,    Holt (1995, p. 398) concludes that “sellers are sometimes able to exercise
market power in double auctions, but the influence of seller market power is much weaker (in the
double auction) because of the incentives to offer last-minute price concessions and the more
active role that buyers have in this institution.”  Since the monopolist cannot pre-commit to the
monopoly price as trading progresses, it lowers its price when gains from trade still exist at the
end of a trading period.  As these price reductions become public knowledge, in succeeding
periods more buyers wait for the price reductions, causing the monopolist’s market power to be
eroded further, as it may be more profitable for the monopolist to make some sales at competitive
prices than no sales at all.   
Such results have led some to suggest that potential  market power in emissions trading
can be controlled by using double auctions  (Bohm 1998).  We argue that the existing laboratory
evidence is too weak to support this policy conclusion, for a number of reasons.  The claims for
the double auction are based on very few laboratory sessions  (three for Smith, five for Smith and
Williams) and these were not exactly comparable.    Moreover, Smith’s original experiments
showed substantial output restriction under monopoly (on average his monopolists traded 2.28
units less than the competitive output, or 76 percent of the predicted output restriction of three
units), so that efficiency may suffer in double auction markets even if prices are not raised.  
Finally, neither experiment provides a controlled contrast between competitive and monopoly
environments.3
It may be particularly difficult for double auctions to control market power in emission
trading markets.  Emission trading markets exhibit some special features not always found in the
paradigmatic buyer/seller markets investigated by Smith.  One is that sellers of emission permits
generally have the option of earning profits by using unsold permits in their own operations.  The
Smith environment does not reflect this aspect of the field: his sellers are given marginal cost
schedules.  They earn no profits at all unless they trade.  An alternative is to assign to the sellers
redemption values similar to but lower than the buyers’ values.  Selling a coupon then represents a
foregone redemption value.  This may create a frame in which sellers may be less vulnerable to
counter-withholding by buyers.  Another special feature of many emissions markets is that agents
can act as traders, buying and selling permits for resale or repurchase.  This does not affect
predicted prices under competition or single price monopoly,  but it may introduce more noise
into the price structure and lead to unknown dynamic effects.
Several experiments have detected market power being exercised by dominant firms in
double auction markets for tradable emission permits. Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994)
adapted Smith’s parameters to an emissions trading environment by allowing all agents to buy and
sell coupons.  It appears, however, that they continued to provide sellers with a marginal cost
schedule rather than redemption values.  In two of three sessions they discovered a “strong”
monopolist who was able to achieve earnings close to those predicted for a single price
monopolist.  Even in the last period of the experiment the strong monopolists were able to
achieve about 25 percent of the potential monopoly price increase  (mean prices for the weak3  The potential price increase is derived from predictions for a monopolist who posts a single price
throughout a period.  See data and sources in Table 13 below.
4  These data refer to “simple manipulation”.  Brown Kruse, Elliott, and Godby also considered
“strategic manipulation”, under which agents with market power  had an incentive to alter their permit 
purchases to affect conditions in a downstream market.
4
monopolist were actually below competitive equilibrium).
3
Brown-Kruse, Elliott, and Godby (1995) also detected market power in laboratory
markets related to emissions trading.  In their experiment single buyers or single sellers of
emission permits with a capacity to use ten permits participated in a market with ten sellers or ten
buyers of one permit each. The value of a permit was derived from the cost savings it permitted
the subject.  The subject with market power had information about the cost schedules of the
remaining participants.  In the last period of their sessions,  monopolists achieved an average of
40 percent of the potential price gain and monopsonists 166 percent of the potential price
reduction.
4  
Godby (1999, 2000) replicated many of these results in a market which allowed trading. 
He aggregated the ten smaller agents in the Brown-Kruse, Elliott and Godby experiment into five
composite subjects with the capacity to use two permits each, while retaining a single buyer or
single seller with the capacity to use ten permits.  All subjects were permitted to both buy and sell
permits in the same period.  In the last period of the experiment his monopsonists achieved an
average of 147 percent of the available price reduction.  His monopolists were not so successful. 
Despite a pattern of high prices in earlier periods, by the tenth period transactions prices  in the
monopoly market were below competitive levels.
In short, the limited laboratory evidence suggests that it is premature to be sanguine about5
the ability of double auctions to control market power.  Further investigation is required before
reaching a definite conclusion.  In particular, it would be useful to directly contrast the
performance of competitive and monopoly markets under the same set of underlying cost
conditions.   This paper presents such an experiment.   We create a laboratory market in which ten
traders are given redemption value schedules and allowed to trade permits.  Five are expected to
be net buyers of permits, five net sellers. We then aggregate either the five buyers into a single
monopsonist or the five sellers into a single monopolist.  Thus we consider market power both on
the selling side (monopoly) and on the buying side (monopsony).   Unlike all previous
experimenters, who have adopted a between-sessions design for investigating this problem, we
adopt an ABA crossover design to allow for fuller experimental control over subject effects.  In
this design we control for subject effects by allowing the same group to participate in both market
power and competitive environments.  Within any one session we switch between competition and
a market power and back again.  This allows a powerful contrast between the two market
structures.
The present experiment is directed at establishing a more general research program into
the exercise of market power in auction markets.  We focus first on establishing a baseline design
and second on confirming the existence of market power.  If market power is found in these
sessions, a broad-ranging research program into the determinants of that power becomes very
attractive.  If market power is not confirmed we will be in a position to support the policy
recommendations alluded to above.
Experimental Design
We created a market environment in which ten subjects traded coupons in a computerized5  We used the RNSC double auction reported in Godby, Mestelman, Muller and Welland (1997)
and described in more detail in Mestelman and Muller (1998). 
6
double auction.  Subjects were informed that they each represented a firm which produced a
product from several inputs.  One input, called  leets, was rationed.  Each period the firm received
revenues from selling its product and incurred costs from purchasing inputs.  The difference
between revenues and the cost of all inputs except leets was denoted net  sales  revenue. Leets
could be used to reduce costs.  The sum of this cost saving and the net sales revenue was the
firm’s  total operating profit.  The marginal value of a ration coupon, therefore, was the increase
in total operating profit induced by employing one more unit of leets.  These definitions were
illustrated by Table 1, which is reproduced from the instructions. 
Subjects were further told that some of them would receive shares in the ration coupons. 
Each share entitled the subject to one coupon per period.  Coupons could be used to increase
operating profits or sold to other subjects.  Subjects who did not receive shares could choose to
buy coupons.  Once bought, these coupons could be used to increase operating profits or resold
to other subjects.  In this experiment, coupons are analogous to annual emission permits.  Shares
are analogous to a permanent entitlement to a flow of annual permits.  We adopted the
shares/coupons terminology prevent the subjects’ being influenced by emotional reactions to the
concept of emissions trading and to be consistent with the terms used in the software.
Subjects traded coupons in a computerized double auction market.
5   They were guided in
their trading by a  wizard, a small window which informed them how much adding or subtracting
one coupon from their holdings would change their operating profits.    A market consisted of a
number of trading periods.  At the end of each trading period, subjects were informed of the7
redemption value of their coupon holdings, their net sales revenue and their operating profit for
the period.  Total earnings, including profits from trading, were continuously displayed in an
inventory screen. Total earnings were displayed at the of each market.
Each experimental session contained four markets: one practice market lasting two or
three periods of 10 minutes each and three data markets lasting for 10 periods of three minutes
each.  Subjects recorded their earnings at the end of each data market.  At the end of the session
they were paid their earnings privately in cash.
The redemption values used in the experiment are derived from those used by Smith
(1981), Smith and Williams (1989)  and Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994).  The original
parameters were expressed as supply and demand schedules.  They induced a single competitive
equilibrium price, an efficient trading quantity of eight, and a market power equilibrium quantity
of five. We made four adjustments.  First, we eliminated the need for commissions by raising the
demand curve and lowering the supply curve to create an equilibrium price tunnel of five cents. 
Secondly, we altered the supply curve to maintain the three  unit separation of the competitive
and market power predictions. Thirdly we expressed the sellers’ marginal opportunity costs as
redemption values.  Finally, we introduced fixed costs and revenues computed so as to induce a
profit of 100 cents per period for each player when coupons are efficiently allocated and the
market price is at the mid-point of the equilibrium price tunnel (87 cents).  These baseline
parameters are reported in Table 2 and are reflected in the supply and demand schedules shown in
Figures 1 and 2.
We considered three market structures: competition, monopoly and monopsony.  In the
baseline (competitive) environment, each agent received two redemption values. The five agents6  Instructions are available from R. Andrew Muller(mullera@mcmaster.ca).
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with lowest valuations each received two coupons per period.  These agents were expected to be
net sellers of coupons.  The five agents with highest valuations received no coupons.  These
agents were expected to be buyers.  In the monopoly environment we simulated a merger among
the five sellers by combining their redemption values schedules into one.  The remaining four
sellers were “locked out” of the market, however  they still received fixed revenues sufficient to
yield profits of 100 cents per period.  Similarly, the fixed costs of the monopolist were raised to
yield an expected profit of 100 cents at the efficient allocation.  The monopsony  treatment was
like the monopoly treatment, expect that the buyer’s schedules were combined.  The monopoly
and monopsony parameters are reported in Table 3 and are reflected diagrammatically in Figures
1 and 2 respectively.  
As noted, each of the sessions consisted of a practice market (denoted Market 0 in this
paper) and three real markets (denoted Markets 1, 2 and 3 in this paper).  Different redemption
values were used in each market.  The redemption values in the practice market bore no
relationship to the values in the real markets.  The basic parameter sets of Table 2  and Table 3
were used in Market 1.  In the Market 2 all redemption values were displaced downwards by
subtracting 23 cents from each coupon value.  In Market 3, all redemption values were displaced
upwards by 26 cents from the baseline values.  Fixed revenues were adjusted to maintain a proft
of 100 cents for each agent under an efficient allocation.
Each session required 10 subjects.  The unpaid practice market lasted for one or two
periods of ten minutes each.  During this time, subjects were carefully instructed in the use of the
software.
6   Following this, all ten subjects participated in all three markets for that session.9
Monopoly and  monopsony market structures were independently contrasted with competition in
two ABA  crossover designs (see Table  4). During the market power sessions (monopoly or
monopsony) the four subjects who were shut out of the market were invited to observe the
trading or to read a book.  Their attention was drawn to the experiment, however, because
interaction with the computer software was required at the beginning and end of every period,
even for the shut-out subjects.
Benchmarks and Predictions
We computed trading volumes, prices, profits and gains from trade under four benchmark
predictions (Table 5).  The no-trade benchmark, obviously, represents the result of the initial
distribution of coupons. With this allocation, buyers earn 244 cents per period and sellers earn
305 cents, for a total of 549.   Gains from trade are the increase in profits from these benchmark. 
The competitive (or efficient) benchmark is the configuration which maximizes the total gains
from trade.  With this allocation, buyers and sellers both earn 500 cents per period, a gain of 256
cents for buyers and 195 cents for sellers.  Total profits rise to 1000 cents, thus the total gains
from trade are 451 cents. 
The monopoly and monopsony benchmarks are the configurations which would  maximize
the gains for a single seller or a single buyer posting a single price. The monopolist would post a
price of 113 cents per unit, the monopsonist 61 cents. Under the benchmark monopoly allocation,
five coupons would be sold.  The sellers collectively  would earn 601 cents, of which 400 would
be fixed revenue payments to the inactive sellers and 201 would be the profit of the monopolist.
Buyers collectively would earn 344 cents per period.   Gains from trade are 296 cents for the
single seller and 100 cents for the buyers collectively.  Total gains from trade are 396 cents, or10
87.8 percent of the total possible gains of 451.  Under the benchmark monopsony equilibrium five
coupons would also be sold.  The buyers collectively would earn 604 cents (for a total gain of 104
cents), of which 400 cents accrue to the inactive participants.  The sellers collectively earn 341
cents (for a total gain of 36 cents). Overall efficiency is 87.8 percent, the same as in monopoly. 
The benchmark prices and quantities are displayed in Figures 1 and 2.
Results
We ran a pilot session and four data sessions in late April and May 1999 and four
additional data sessions in July 1999.  Four subjects, who were to be given the role of monopolist
or monopsonist, were recruited from post-doctoral fellows and graduate students in economics
and business.  The remaining thirty-six subjects were recruited from the general student
population through advertisements and classroom announcements.  Sessions were planned to last
for no more than 3 hours.  Due to computer failures in a number of runs, the sessions lasted
somewhat longer, up to 3½  hours.  On these occasions, subjects gained additional trading
experience in the aborted sessions.  Due to the length of the sessions, three subjects had to be
excused (one in session 990501a and two in session 990506b) .  These were replaced by available
graduate students (one in Mathematics and one in Economics), who had participated in a pilot
session the previous week.  Because of the length of the session, the competitive market in the
third session (990506b) was terminated after 8 periods.  After each session was over subjects
completed a debriefing questionnaire and were paid privately in cash.   The competitive subjects
earned between $11.82 and $36.23 (mean $26.22) for their participation, plus a $5.00 show-up
fee.  The subjects with market power earned $39.13 to $66.91 (mean 48.16;  see Table 6).
We first present a graphical overview of transactions prices in the eight sessions.  We then7  The redemption value and marginal cost schedules were displayed in the second and third markets
of each session.  The prices reported in the discussion below are normalized to be comparable to the prices
in the first market of each session.
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turn to numerical analysis of mean prices, volumes, profits, effectiveness and efficiency.  In
general we compute each of these values by period and average over the observed periods
(generally 10) in each market.  Accordingly, we have one observation for each market in each
session, for a total of 24 observations.  Although the graphical and tabular results speak for
themselves we also report statistical tests of the null hypotheses that treatment (monopoly,
monopsony or competition) and market sequence (one, two or three) have no effect on the mean
values of these variables.   These tests are based on one-way and two-way analysis of variance. 
We recognize that the reported significance tests are conditional on the independence of errors
across observations.  While this is clearly true across sessions, it is equally clear that the results in
Markets 2 and 3 of any given session might be dependent on the subjects’ experience in preceding
markets.  We believe we have reduced the potential for such interdependence by averaging over
all of the observations in a market.  In any case,  the overwhelming apparent statistical
significance of most our results suggests that they are unlikely to be altered by more elaborate
statistical methods.
Prices
Figure 3 gives an overview of transaction prices by market structure.
7   The three time-
series are the means in each trading period of the median prices in each period across twelve
competitive markets, six monopoly markets and six monopsony markets.  The aggregated data for
the competitive markets clearly reflect the conventional result that competitive market prices tend
to converge to the competitive equilibrium price in a double-auction environment.  The median12
prices in the markets in which traders had market power are not drawn into the competitive
equilibrium price band (85 to 89 cents).  Monopoly prices tend to stabilize above the competitive
equilibrium price band while monopsony prices stabilize below this band.  Monopoly prices are
further from the predicted single-price monopoly price of 113 cents than are monopsony prices
from the single-price monopsony price of 61 cents.
The aggregated data of Figure 3 do not reflect the variation in price patterns that were
generated across sessions and markets.  Figures 4, 5 and 6 display a distinctive switching pattern
between competitive and market-power treatments.  The convention used in these figures is to
represent markets 1, 2 and 3 with a circle, square, and triangle respectively.  Closed symbols and
bold lines reflect market-power environments.  The data are the means  in each trading period of
two sessions of the median prices in each period.  In Figure 4 the monopoly market was
sandwiched between two competitive markets (the CSC session).   The tendency was for prices to
rise from the competitive market to the monopoly market and return to the competitive price in
the subsequent market.  Figure 5 displays the same pattern for the CBC sessions, where the price
during the monopsony market falls below the prices in the competitive markets between which it
is sandwiched.  Figure 6 displays the price summary for the BCB sessions in which the
competitive market is sandwiched between two monopsony markets.  Figure 7, summarizing the
SCS sessions, does not display the switching pattern.  The relatively high monopoly market 1 
prices are followed by lower competitive market 2 prices, but the market 3 monopoly prices do
not rise above the competitive market prices. 
The upper portion of Table 7 reports mean prices by type of session and market.  The
mean prices for CSC,  CBC and BCB sessions are consistent with the switching pattern just13
discussed.  The lower portion of Table 7 reports mean prices by treatment and market.  The mean
price over all competitive sessions is about 86 cents, within the competitive equilibrium band of
85 to 89 cents.  The mean monopoly price is about 101 cents, much above the competitive band
but distinctly below the benchmark monopoly price of 113.  The mean monopsony price is about
66 cents, somewhat above the benchmark of 61 cents.  Conducting a two-way analysis of variance
on session and market and on treatment and market, we retain the null hypothesis of no market
sequence effects (p = 0.2100 and p = 0.2516 respectively) and strongly reject the hypothesis of no
session or treatment effects (p = 0.0003 and p = 0.0000 respectively). 
Overall, Figures 4 - 7 and Table 7 give clear evidence that switching between competitive
and market power treatments reliably induces a switch between competitive and market power
price patterns.  Monopoly environments reliably raise mean prices and monopsony environments
reliably reduce them.
Output and Efficiency
We define net purchases as the difference between the number of coupons bought and
sold.  Since there is no coupon banking, this is also the number of coupons redeemed. Detailed
examination of the data reveals an anomaly.  In exactly one of the 118 periods we recorded the
appearance of phantom coupons. In that period alone the software appears to have permitted two
subjects to sell more coupons than they owned, so that their net purchases were negative.  We
have excluded this period from the following tabulations.
There is some evidence that output was restricted in our market power environments,
however the extent of restriction is much less than predicted by theory.  Table 8 reports mean net
purchases of coupons by treatment and market.  Recall that the benchmark net purchases are eight14
in competition and five both in monopoly and monopsony.  Table 8 indicates an observed mean of
7.07 coupons in competition and 6.72 coupons in the monopoly treatment and 6.09 coupons in
the monopsony treatment.  We retain the null hypothesis that a three-way treatment classification
has no effect on net purchases.  If, however,  we combine the monopoly and monopsony
categories, we can weakly reject the null of no effect of market power (ANOVA, p = 0.0709)
while the null of no market sequence effect is maintained (ANOVA, p = 0.7118).   Note that these
are two-tailed tests. 
The relatively small output restriction suggests that we will not find that efficiency is
significantly affected by market power.  This is confirmed by Table 9, which tabulates efficiency
by treatment and market.  On average our markets were quite efficient, achieving 91 percent of
available gains from trade.  One quarter of the individual markets (the two monopsony Markets 1,
one monopsony Market 3, one monopoly Market 2, one competitive Market 1, and one
competitive Market 3) exhibit substantially lower efficiencies (between 83 and 85 percent).  The
null hypothesis of no treatment or market effects is easily retained, however (p = 0.5250 and p =
0.2737 respectively).  This pattern suggests that the monopolists and monopsonists may have
succeeded in a substantial degree of price discrimination.   
Profits and Effectiveness
Although output was not greatly restricted by the exercise of market power, the
distribution of profit certainly was.  Table 10 reports profits by role, treatment and market.  These
profits include the fixed net revenues paid to inactive traders.  The observed profits should be read
in conjunction with the benchmarks of Table 5.  Consider the buyers.  There is substantial
variation among the observations.  Nevertheless, in competitive markets they earned an average of15
500 cents per period, exactly the benchmark profit.  In monopoly markets their profits fell to 364,
slightly above the benchmark of 344.  In monopsony markets their profits rose to 601, somewhat
below the benchmark of 604.   Sellers’ mean  profits were 458 cents in competition (below the
benchmark of 500), 602 under monopoly (barely above the benchmark of 601), and 350 (slightly
above the benchmark of 341).  The treatment effect is statistically significant (one-way ANOVA,
p = 0.0000 for buyers and for sellers).  We conclude that market structure has affected the
distribution of profits in much the same manner as predicted by single price monopoly theory. 
The distribution of profits differs according to market structure and there is evidence that
market structure systematically affected the ability of buyers or sellers to achieve their benchmark
profits.   We define an effectiveness index equal to the ratio of the buyers’ or the sellers’ gains
from trade relative to their predicted gains from a no trade baseline under the given market
structure.  The results are reported in Table 11 and summarized in Figure 8.  For buyers, the
average effectiveness indexes are 1.00 for competition, 1.20 for monopoly, and 0.99 for
monopsony.  This indicates that buyers did better than predicted in monopoly environments and
about as well as they were expected to do in competitive and in monopsony environments.  When
the other side had the market power, the buyers achieved substantially more than their predicted
profits.  Sellers did best when buyers had market power (an effectiveness index of 1.24) and
relatively poorly under competition (index of 0.78).  When they had market power, sellers did
about as expected (index of 1.01).     These results depend heavily on variations across the market
sequence, however.  In the final market, buyers quite systematically earn more than predicted and
sellers earn less.  In the first market, buyers in monopoly and sellers in monopsony environments
are distinctly disadvantaged.  Experience in competitive and market power environments appears16
to have an impact on the distribution of gains from trade.  Analysis of variance on these data
retains the null hypothesis of no effect of market structure (p = 0.6364 and p = 0.6013 for buyers
and sellers respectively) or market sequence for sellers (p = 0.5130).   However the null
hypothesis of no effect of market sequence can be marginally rejected for buyers (p = 0.0722).
Speculation
Participants in these sessions are not restricted to either buy or sell coupons.  In the role of
traders, individuals who might ultimately be net sellers of coupons may purchase coupons for later
sale if they believe that this is a profitable activity.  With the ability to speculate, the number of
transactions which take place in any trading period may greatly exceed the predicted equilibrium
number of trades.  Table 12 shows the mean purchases of coupons per period by treatment and
market sequence.  On average, in competitive markets more than 11 coupons are traded in each
period, but only 7 net purchases are made.  Nearly 40 percent of transactions are speculative. 
Approximately 26 percent of the transactions in monopoly markets are speculative while fewer
than 5 percent of monopsony market trades were speculative.  With respect to mean coupon
purchases, the treatment effect is significant (ANOVA, p = 0.0484).
The large number of trades which took place in the competitive markets may have
contributed to the relatively low efficiency (91 percent) in these markets as compared to
competitive markets in which participants act as either buyers or sellers.  Speculative purchases in
the markets with traders introduce sufficient noise that even the double auction is unable to
discipline trading sufficiently to guarantee that all of the gains from trade are realized.8  The low prices may arise from speculation that fails.  If a high valuation trader (see Table 2),
who should purchase two coupons, purchases three units quickly in a trading period, expecting to sell one
for a profit later in the period, does not resell that third unit soon enough, he may sell it for whatever he can
17
Price Discrimination
The existence of prices significantly different from competitive prices in market power
environments combined with higher than expected efficiencies in many of these markets (see
Table 9 and compare the monopoly and monopsony efficiencies in markets 1 through 3 to the
predicted efficiency of 87.8 percent) suggests that price discrimination may characterize the price
behaviour in these markets.
Figure 9 displays the contract prices by period as they were generated in the first CSC
session.  Contract prices in the first market (S1M1 C) shows many more than eight trades in each
period and contract prices that are range between the single-price monopoly price of 113 cents
and the single-price monopsony price of 61 cents.  The traders are inexperienced and appear to be
overwhelmed with their ability to speculate.  In the second market (S1M2 S), in which there is a
single seller, contracts are formed initially at prices above 113 cents, period after period, and fall
throughout each period, usually ending at a price in, or close to, the competitive equilibrium price
band.  This appears to reflect effective price discrimination.  Trading in a double auction does not
result in prices uniformly converging to the competitive equilibrium price after several trading
periods.  Finally, in the third market (S1M3 C), five sellers and five buyers quickly converge into
the competitive equilibrium price band.  With the exception of several trades at exceptionally low
prices, this market conforms to our expectation of trading in a double auction with five buyers and
five sellers.
8obtain.  If there is another buyer who is waiting for the last minute for bargains is in this market, the low
trade may be consummated.  Because the speculator’s opportunity cost of the third unit is zero, it may sell
for very little.  The negative value in market S1M3 C arises because the schedules in this market have been
shifted up by 26 cents.  Any contract at a price below 26 cents will appear as a negative value when prices
are normalized.
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Figure 10 displays the contract prices by period as they were generated in the first BCB
session.  The first market (S4M1 B) has a single buyer of coupons.  In this market contracts are
formed at very low prices in the first few trading periods, but these prices quickly converge near
to the single-price monopsony price.  By the fifth trading period contract prices are first formed at
just below 61 cents and then rise towards the competitive price.  In this market there is weak prie
discrimination.  Most noteworthy is that  opening contract prices do not converge into the
competitive equilibrium price band.  The second market (S4M2 C) has five buyers and five sellers. 
This market ended after eight trading periods because of a computer malfunction, but eight
periods were more than enough to demonstrate the expected convergence to the competitive price
range.  Finally, market S4M3 B once again generates monopsonistic pricing.  Prices begin slightly
below the single-price monopsonist price of 61 cents and fall to the competitive price range. 
Opening prices once again are consistently below 61 cents.
Figure 11 displays three markets in which market power appears to be exercised even
when there is more than one seller!  It is important to note here that in nominal terms the single-
price monopoly price prediction is 113 cents and the competitive price range is between 85 cents
and 89 cents in the first market.  In the second market these are 90 cents and 62 to 66 cents
respectively.  In the third market these are 139 cents and 111 to 115 cents respectively.
The first market (S2M1 S) is a monopoly market.  Prices consistently open above 113 and
fall to the competitive range.  The mean contract price in the last trading period is 106.3 cents and19
the closing price is in the competitive equilibrium price band.  This appears to be another example
of price discrimination.  The second market (S2M2 C) has five buyers and five sellers.  The
competitive equilibrium price band for this market is between 62 and 66 cents.  Even though the
last price seen by these traders in market 1 was approximately 85 cents the five sellers are able to
keep the opening price in each period at or above 90 cents.  Prices fall throughout each trading
period, frequently getting as low as 40 cents (with two contracts well below 30 cents).  In the
final trading period the mean contract price is 72 cents and the last contract price is in the
competitive equilibrium price band of 62 to 66 cents.  This potentially competitive market does
not converge to the competitive equilibrium price.  The five sellers in this double-auction market
are successful in keeping mean contract prices above the competitive equilibrium price band
through the ten trading periods.  Finally, when the third market, with a single seller, begins
trading, the opening exceeds the single-price monopoly nominal price of 139 cents.  Although the
opening contract prices gradually drop below 139 cents in this market, the monopolist is able to
consistently enter into contracts above the competitive equilibrium price band early in the trading
period.  The final period mean contract price is 117 cents, slightly above the competitive
equilibrium price band of 111 to 115.
After one market of very effective price discrimination, and a second market of successful
price manipulation by a group of sellers, the double-auction institution finally began to exhibit
some of the discipline that we expect from it.  However, even in this market prices were, on
average, maintained above the competitive equilibrium price band.
The nine markets described above display clear tendencies for market power to emerge in
varying degrees under double-auction trading rules.  In one case a market power outcome20
appeared to emerge when market power was not expected to emerge.  One characteristic of these
market power outcomes is the pattern of price discrimination rather than single-price monopoly or
monopsony.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our results extend and confirm the findings of Brown Kruse, Elliot and  Godby (1995),
Godby (1997) , and Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994), all of which challenge the conventional
assertion that double auctions provide an effective constraint on market power.   Our study is
unique in employing a within-subjects design which allows us to control for subject effects more
precisely than is possible in a between-subjects design.   The cost of this additional control is a
loss of independence between the observations within a given session.  On the other hand the
ability to alternate between market structures within the same session  provides a rigorous test of
the causal link between market structure and performance and, in our opinion, more than
compensates for the statistical difficulties.
Our results clearly establish that our monopoly and monopsony subjects were able to
manipulate prices to their advantage despite any limitations placed on them by the double-auction
institution.  This does not appear to be a transient effect which is eliminated through learning.
Figures 9 - 11 show examples of price discrimination by both monopolists and
monopolists as well as evidence of some of decay in market power within markets.  Of particular
note is what appears to be the inability of a market without a market power agent to converge to
the competitive equilibrium.   The insignificant effect on efficiency and  the relatively small
constraint on net purchases, together with the observed price patterns, strongly suggest that
efficiency losses were mitigated by price discrimination.   As a result, subjects with market power21
were able to increase their share of the profits substantially (relative to the competitive
environments) without greatly harming efficiency.  
Our results exhibit a stronger effect of market power in double auctions than was
observed in most previous work.  Table 13 compares the price results across our experiment and
five predecessors.  To allow for the possibility of convergence to competitive equilibrium a
session we examine only the mean prices in the last periods reported.  In the present experiment,
monopolists achieved 55 percent of the potential price increase while our monopsonists achieved
65 percent of the potential price declines.  The monopolists were more successful than those of
previous experiments while the monopsonists were somewhat less successful in comparison.  
One might legitimately ask if the success of subjects with market power is due to a lack of
experience in the double-auction market.  Because previous experiments ran only one market per
session they provide little evidence on this score.  In our sessions, however, participants in Market
3 had experience in both a competitive and a market power environment in the immediately
preceding markets.  Although we have only two observations per cell in this case, the results
suggest a possibility that monopsony resists pressures for price erosion more than monopoly.  The
monopolists in this situation achieved, on average, 29.5 percent of the benchmark price deviation
in the last period while the monopsonist achieved, on average, 64.5 percent.  These results
suggest that careful investigation of the effect of experience in these markets would be valuable.
Our work, together with the emissions trading papers cited earlier, provides a dramatic
contrast to the conventional wisdom (in experimental economics at least) that double auctions can
control market power.  It would be useful to explore whether this contrast arises from the special
characteristics of emissions trading or whether the standard results of Smith and of Smith and22
Williams are in need of reinterpretation.  As noted, emissions trading environments differ from the
paradigmatic double-auction environment in a number of ways, including the presence of traders
buying for potential resale and the fact that sellers have a highly visible use for coupons not sold.
 On a broader policy level, our results suggest that it is unwise to rely on market
institutions, such as the double auction, to control market power in emissions trading markets. 
Our evidence of successful price discrimination also suggests that the income distribution effects
of market power may be more important than the efficiency effects.  
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Total Value of Coupons
(cents)
0 0 300 300 0 0
1 1  owned 300 550 250 250
2 2  owned 300 700 150 400
3 3 300 750 50 450
Note: Please note that this table is only an example.  The numbers in the experiment are quite
different.24
Table 2.  Basic Parameters For Competitive Environments
Trader Numbers
High Valuations (Buyers ) Lower Valuations (Sellers)
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Net Sales Revenue 34 44 52 56 58 -109 -87 -74 -74 -74
Coupon Allocation 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
Redemption Value 
Coupon 1  153  143  133  123  113  122  100  85  77  70 
Coupon 2  80  84  89  95  103  52  52  52  52  61 
Profit in Efficient
Allocation
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note:  Profit in efficient allocation includes both net trading revenue and the value of coupons
redeemed.25
Table 3.  Basic Parameters For Market Power Environments
Monopoly 
High Valuations (Buyers) Lower Valuations (Sellers)
1  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Net Sales Revenue 34 44 52 56 58 100 100 100 100 -818
Coupon Allocation 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0  10
Redemption Value 
Coupon  1 153  143  133  123  113  0  0  0  0  122
Coupon  2 80  84  89  95  103  0  0  0  0  100
Coupon  3 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  85
Coupon  4 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  77
Coupon  5 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  70
Coupon  6 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  61
 Coupon  7 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  52
Coupon  8 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  52
Coupon 9 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  52
Coupon 10 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  52
Profit in Efficient
Allocation 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Monopsony
High Valuations (Buyers) Lower Valuations (Sellers)
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Net Sales Revenue -156 100 100 100 100 -109 -87 -74 -74 -74
Coupon Allocation 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
Redemption Value 
Coupon 1  153  0  0  0  0  122  100  85  77  70 
Coupon 2  143 0  0  0  0  52  52  52  52  61 
Coupon 3  133 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Coupon 4  123 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Coupon 5  113 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Coupon  6  103 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 Coupon  7 95  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Coupon  8 89  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Coupon 9 84  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Coupon 10 80  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Profit in Efficient
Allocation 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10026
Table 4.  Experimental Design
Session
Treatment  Market
No. Symbol 0 1 2 3
990505A 1  CSC Practice Competition   Monopoly Competition
990506A 2  SCS Practice Monopoly Competition Monopoly
990506B 3   CBC Practice  Competition Monopsony Competition
990507A 4  BCB Practice Monopsony Competition Monopsony
990712A 5 CSC Practice Competition   Monopoly Competition
990714A 6  SCS Practice Monopoly Competition Monopoly
990720A 7  CBC Practice  Competition Monopsony Competition
990722A 8  BCB Practice Monopsony Competition Monopsony
Notes: Practice Markets ran for one or two 10 minute periods during which instruction was given
and practice trading occurred..  Markets 1 through 3 ran for ten 3 minute periods.  There were 10
subjects in each session, 4 of whom were inactive during the monopoly or monopsony markets.27






trade Efficiency Buyers Sellers Market
No Trade 0  244  305  549 
Competition 8  85 - 89 500  500  1000  451  100.00%
Monopoly 5  113  344  601  945  396  87.80%
Monopsony 5  61  604  341  945  396  87.80%28











Notes  Data reported are profits earned.  Subjects were paid this amount rounded up to the
nearest 25 cents, plus a 5 dollar show-up fee.29
Table 7.  Mean Prices by Session and Market and by Treatment and Market  (Number of
Observations in Parentheses)
Market











































































Notes: Data are mean prices per period averaged over all periods of each market.  Two-way
analyses of variance were conducted on session and market and on treatment and market.  The
null of no market effect is easily retained (p=0.2100 and p=0.2516 respectively).  Session effects
are significant (p=0.0003) and treatment effects are strongly significant (p= 0.0000).  All tests
maintain the hypothesis of independent errors across markets within a session.30
Table 8.  Mean Net Purchases of Coupons per Period, by Treatment and Market 
(Number of Observations in Parentheses)
Market 













































Notes: Net purchases are the differences between coupons purchased and coupons sold by the five
agents with high valuations (“buyers”).  Data are the means over the observed number of periods,
excluding period 6 of market 3, session 3, during which a computer error allowed coupon use. 
The difference between net purchases under competitive and market power environments (an
aggregated treatment effect) is marginally significant (ANOVA, p = 0.0709) but market effects
are not significant (ANOVA, p = 0.7118).31
Table 9.  Mean Efficiency Indexes by Treatment and Market (Number of Observations in
Parentheses)
Market     

































Notes: Efficiency is the ratio of gains from trade for the period for all agents combined to the
benchmark gain under competition for the period (451).  Data are the means over replications of
the mean efficiency over periods for the session and market.  The null hypothesis of no treatment
or market effects is easily retained (ANOVA, p = 0.5250 and p = 0.2737 respectively). 32
Table 10.  Mean Profit per Period  by Treatment, Market and Role (Number of Observations in
Parentheses)
Market



































































Total 948 963 964 958
Notes: Data are the mean profit per period for all five buyers or sellers respectively, including
fixed net revenues.  Period 6 of Market 3 in Session 3 was excluded.  Data for market 2 of
Session 4 (a competitive market) are the means of the 8 observed periods.  The treatment effect is
statistically significant (p=0.0000 for buyers, p=0.0000 for sellers).33
Table 11.  Mean Effectiveness Indexes by Treatment, Market and Role (Number of Observations
in Parentheses)
Market       



































































Notes: Effectiveness is the ratio of the gains from trade realized by buyers or sellers collectively to
benchmark profit gains for trade for that group under the given treatment.  A negative
effectiveness index indicates that the relevant group reduced their profit by trading.  Data are
means of the mean effectiveness index by period for each session and market.  Data for Session 3,
Market 3, Period 6 are excluded.  The null hypotheses of no effect of treatment or market are
easily retained for buyers (ANOVA, p = 0.6364 and p = 0.5130 respectively) but for sellers the
null of no effect of treatment is easily retained while it is marginally significant for market
(ANOVA, p = 0.6013 and p = 0.0722 respectively).34
Table 12.  Mean Purchases of Coupons per Period, by Treatment and Market 
(Number of Observations in Parentheses)
Market 

































Notes: Data are the means over the observed number of periods.  The treatment effect is
significant (ANOVA, p = 0.0484), but neither the market effect nor interaction of market and
treatment effects are significant (ANOVA, p = 0.9472 and p = 0.5203 respectively).35
Table 13.  Mean Percentage Change from Competitive Benchmark to Market Power Benchmark






























Source: Mestelman, Muller, and Godby (1998) tabulate the data for Smith (1981), Smith and
Williams (1989), Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994), Brown Kruse, Elliott and Godby (1995)
and Godby (1997) .  
Notes: All experiments except the present ran one market per session.  There is evidence that
repetition reduces monopolists’ success in raising prices. The mean deviation in the last period of
the third markets of the present experiment was 29.5 percent of the benchmark deviation for the
monopolist and 64.5 percent for the monopsonist.36
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Figure 4     Mean of Median Per Period Contract Prices for Competitive and Monopoly Markets













































Figure 5     Mean of Median Per Period Contract Prices for Competitive and Monopsony Markets













































Figure 6     Mean of Median Per Period Contract Prices for Competitive and Monopsony Markets













































Figure 7     Mean of Median Per Period Contract Prices for Competitive and Monopoly Markets






































































































































Figure 8     Percent Deviation of Efficiency, Buyer Effectiveness, and Seller Effectiveness from
the Predicted Efficiency, Buyer Effectiveness, and Seller Effectiveness under Varying Market
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